This paper explores the agency relationship between a lawyer and a client in the context of deciding whether to settle a case. The impact of alternative fee arrangements on settlement disputes is empirically assessed in a discrete dependent variable econometric model utilizing survey data from lawyers in British Columbia. In contrast to the previous research based on traditional single-task principal-agent models, a broader multitask perspective of a lawyer's practice is explored. More frequent settlement disputes are observed where the handling of disbursements is one-sided, and among lawyers who advertise, use lump sum billing and pursue jury trials and punitive damages. Disputes are less frequent among lawyers who employ percentage contingency fees and hourly rate contracts with a bonus for successful results. Disputes are also less frequent among lawyers in larger firms. There is also evidence that legal fee regulation and ex post judicial review of legal fees in British Columbia have affected the frequency of settlement disputes.
It is widely recognized that the choice of legal fee contract is a response to Ž Ž . Ž . conditions of asymmetric information Dana and Spier 1993 , Danzon 1983 Restrictions on legal fee arrangements are designed to limit conflicts of interest between lawyers and their clients. Previous theoretical and empirical research has related conflicts of interest in the settlement decision to legal fee arrangements.
Ž . Schwartz and Mitchell 1970 predicted that income maximizing attorneys will work fewer hours than needed under contingent fee contracts to maximize plaintiff settlements. This prediction is based on the assumptions that there is a positive relation between out-of-court settlement size and the number of hours that lawyers invest in their plaintiffs' claims, and that plaintiffs are ignorant of the relationship between attorney hours and settlement size. Schwartz and Mitchell also assumed Ž . that attorneys only adjust their labour input. Danzon 1983 , on the other hand, showed that when attorneys adjust their labour input as well as the contingency fees percentage there is no conflict of interest between lawyers and their clients.
Ž . Kritzer et al. 1985 hypothesized that contingency fee lawyers would spend less time on cases than hourly-rate lawyers. This hypothesis was tested using data from 371 hourly-rate and 288 contingency fee contracts. Kritzer et al. found that contingency fee lawyers work less than hourly rate lawyers for claims under $6000, and the number of hours invested by contingency fee lawyers increased with the Ž . size of the claim. In the context of class action suits, Rosenfield 1976 conjectured that attorneys would maximize their own welfare at the expense of their clients because none of the individual class members would have sufficient interest to monitor their lawyers' actions. Data from 104 class action suits showed attorneys who settled tended to receive greater compensation than those who went to trial, but the amount received by the class was lower among settled cases. The existing empirical literature on conflicts of interest in the settlement decision focuses on the characteristics of specific cases. This article differs from the existing literature by exploring legal practice sources of settlement conflicts with new empirical evidence. The approach taken herein is based on the view that a number of different characteristics of a lawyer's practice, and not simply the characteristics of a case at hand, may lead to a conflict of interest in the settlement decision. In this study, the characteristics of lawyers' practices are scrutinized and related to the frequency with which lawyers have disputes with clients regarding the settlement decision. This new approach does have the drawback that the estimates lack the precision that case-specific data can provide. However, it does enable one to take a broader look at a lawyer's beliefs and characteristics of hisrher practice that may lead to a conflict of interest in the settlement decision. This empirical approach follows the spirit of the multitask principal-agent perspec-Ž . tive formally introduced by Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 and briefly mentioned Ž . in earlier research on legal fees by Clermont and Currivan 1978 and Miller Ž . Ž 1987 . The approach contrasts with previous empirical research e.g., Thomason Ž .. 1991 based on traditional principal-agent frameworks to relate the characteristics of a particular case to the legal fee arrangement employed. The unique empirical evidence provided herein strongly supports the much broader legal practice perspective on the sources of conflicts over settlement.
